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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The appellees maintain that this Court does not have jurisdiction to hear this appeal be-
cause the appellant has not complied with Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
If the Court rejects this argument, however, this Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal 
under Utah Code §78-2-2 (1996) and Article VIII, §3 of the Constitution of the State of 
Utah. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES & STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Does this Court have jurisdiction to hear this matter because the Estate of Kory Pas-
quin did not file its appeal within 30 days as required by Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure? This Court reviews this legal issue for correctness, State v. Peter-
sen, 810 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah 1991). This issue was preserved in the trial court in the 
Final Judgment entered by the District Court on March 2, 1999 (R. 678), and by the 
Stipulation of the parties dated December 23,1999 (R. 808-810). 
2. Is the Estate's appeal barred by the terms of the Stipulation dated December 23, 1999? 
The legal issues raised by this issue are reviewed for correctness, State v. Petersen, 810 
P.2d 421, 425 (Utah 1991), and the factual issues are reviewed under an abuse of dis-
cretion standard. David K. Mast v. Brent Overson, 971 P.2d 928 (Utah App. 
1998.).This issue was preserved by the Stipulation of the parties dated December 23, 
1999 (R. 808-810). 
3. Is there a statutory basis for the District Court's award of reasonable attorneys fees to 
the appellees? This Court reviews the legal issues raised by the District Court's deci-
sion for correctness, State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah 1991). This issue was 
6 
preserved in the trial court by Karly's Motion and Memorandum for Attorney's Fees 
(R.4G4). 
Does the doctrine of estoppel bar the Estate's appeal? This issue of law arises for the 
first time on appeal, and arises because of the appeal; therefore, it could not be raised 
at the District Court level. This Court has considered a new issue of law arising in an 
appeal de novo. See, e.g., State v. Newman, 928 P.2d 1040, 1043 (Utah App. 1996). 
Moreover, in the event that this Court reverses the District Court's rulings and re-
mands for further proceedings, this Court should consider this issue because it would 
arise on remand. See, e.g. State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 795 n. 42 (Utah 1991). The issue 
arises out of the Stipulation of the parties. (R. 808-810). 
Does the doctrine of waiver bar the Estate's appeal? This issue of law arises for the first 
time on appeal, and arises because of the appeal; therefore, it could not be raised at the 
District Court level. This Court has considered a new issue of law arising in an appeal 
de novo. See, e.g., State v. Newman, 928 P.2d 1040,1043 (Utah App. 1996). Moreover, 
in the event that this Court reverses the District Court's rulings and remands for fur-
ther proceedings, this Court should consider this issue because it would arise on re-
mand. See, e.g. State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 795 n. 42 (Utah 1991). The issue arises out 
of the Stipulation of the parties. (808-810). 
Does the doctrine of quasi-estoppel bar the Estate's appeal? This issue of law arises for 
the first time on appeal, and arises because of the appeal; therefore, it could not be 
raised at the District Court level. This Court has considered a new issue of law arising 
in an appeal de novo. See, e.g., State v. Newman, 928 P.2d 1040, 1043 (Utah App. 
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1996). Moreover, in the event that this Court reverses the District Court's rulings and 
remands for further proceedings, this Court should consider this issue because it 
would arise on remand. See, e.g. State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 795 n. 42 (Utah 1991). 
The issue arises out of the Stipulation of the parties. (R. 808-810). 
Does the doctrine of judicial estoppel bar the Estate's appeal? This issue of law arises 
for the first time on appeal, and arises because of the appeal; therefore, it could not be 
raised at the District Court level. This Court has considered a new issue of law arising 
in an appeal de novo. See, e.g., State v. Newman, 928 P.2d 1040, 1043 (Utah App. 
1996). Moreover, in the event that this Court reverses the District Court's rulings and 
remands for further proceedings, this Court should consider this issue because it 
would arise on remand. See, e.g. State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 795 n. 42 (Utah 1991). 
The issue arises out of the Stipulation of the parties and this appeal. (R. 808-810). 
Is the Estate's appeal barred because it failed to raise its argument regarding the lack of 
findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the award of Karly's attorney's fees at 
the District Court level? This is a legal issue reviewed for correctness. State v. Petersen, 
810 P.2d421,425 (Utah 1991). 
Can this Court imply findings of fact in the ruhngs of the District Court awarding 
Karly her attorney's fees and costs? The legal issues raised by this issue are reviewed 
for correctness, State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah 1991), and the factual issues 
are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. David K. Mast v. Brent Overson, 
971 P.2d 928, 931 (Utah App. 1998.). This issue was preserved in the trial court in the 
Judgment entered by the District Court on March 2,1999 (R. 678), and by the Stipula-
8 
tion of the parties dated December 23, 1999 (R. 808-810). 
10. Was the District Court's award of Karly's attorney's fees and costs reasonable? This 
factual issue is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. David K. Mast v. Brent 
Overson, 971 P.2d 928, 931 (Utah App. 1998.). This issue was preserved in the trial 
court in the Order Awarding Attorney's Fees and Costs (R. 801-804) and by the 
Court's Ruling of July 27,2000 (R. 937, 938-939). 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following statutes are attached in the addendum: 
Utah Code §§ 78-45a-2 through 78-45a-10 (1997). 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This is a case about a little girl, Karly Madsen, and her four year battle to be recognized as 
the heir of her father, Kory Pasquin, who died in a boating accident at Lake Powell. Karly 
was born out of wedlock to Kory Pasquin and Kristie Madsen. Because of drug abuse prob-
lems, Kristie Madsen eventually surrendered all parental rights over Karly to Kristie's 
mother, Yvette Madsen, who has since cared for the child and acted as her guardian. Kristie 
is currently in drug rehabilitation. 
Before Kory's death, Kristie informed Kory that he was Karly's father. In order to as-
sure Kory that he was, indeed, Karly's father, Kory and Kristie went to the University of 
Utah Eccles Institute of Human Genetics, DNA Paternity Testing Laboratory, to give blood 
samples for the purpose of undergoing genetic testing to determine paternity. The DNA 
tests showed, with an extraordinarily high degree of mathematical certainty, that Kory Pas-
9 
quin was Karly's natural father—the test resulted in a paternity index of 5021. The results 
of the DNA test created a presumption of paternity under the Utah Uniform Act on Pater-
nity, Utah Code § 78-45a-10(3)(a) (1997) (a paternity index of only 150 is necessary to cre-
ate the statutory presumption). 
Notwithstanding the overwhelmingly positive DNA test, however, after Kory's death 
the Estate of Kory Pasquin refused to recognize Karly as an heir to the Estate. That was 
made by Candace Suiter, a former girlfriend of Kory Pasquin, who had been appointed as 
the Estate's personal representative. Ms. Suiter is the mother of Tory Pasquin. Kory Pas-
quin was also the natural father of Tory, who was born out of wedlock to Ms. Suiter. Ms. 
Suiter's refusal to recognize Karly as an heir was a transparent attempt to keep all of the Es-
tate's assets for the benefit of her own child, Tory Pasquin. 
Therefore, the Estate objected to the DNA test under the Utah Uniform Act on Pater-
nity, Utah Code §§ 78-45a-2 et seq. (UUAP), insisting that it had the right to a jury trial on 
the paternity issue under the UUAP, in which Karly had to prove that she is Kory's child. 
On December 1-2, 1998, the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby presided over a jury trial 
regarding the paternity issue and regarding whether Karly was an heir of the Estate. At trial, 
Karly submitted evidence that included testimony of Kristie Madsen that Kory was, indeed, 
Karly's father (after all, a mother would know). Kristie also testified that Kory had accom-
panied her to have blood drawn for the DNA test. In addition, Karly's expert witness testi-
fied as to the validity of the DNA test and the virtual certainty that Kory was Karly's natural 
father. The jury rendered a verdict that Kory Pasquin was Karly's natural father and an heir 
to the Estate. 
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Therefore, on March 2, 1999, Judge Cornaby entered a Final Judgment holding that 
Karly was an heir entitled to one half of Kory Pasquin's Estate, and that Karly was entitled 
to her reasonable attorney's fees and costs in an amount to be determined by the Court. 
Karly's counsel then filed a motion for attorney's fees and costs, supported by the detailed 
affidavit Qf her counsel. The Estate opposed Karly's motion for attorney s fees, protesting 
that the amounts requested were unreasonable. 
Judge Cornaby then held a hearing regarding the issue of fees, during which the Estate 
called Karly's counsel as its sole witness. The Estate extensively cross examined Karly's 
counsel regarding the fees and costs, and regarding his affidavit testimony. However, the 
Estate submitted no evidence, either by affidavit or otherwise, to controvert the written and 
oral testimony of Karly's counsel. The District Court also heard oral argument from both 
parties regarding Karly's motion for fees. Finding that Karly's attorney's fees were reason-
able, the District Court entered an order awarding Karly all of her attorney's fees in the 
amount of $41,212.50 and $3,933.25 in itemized costs. The District Court rejected par t of 
Karly's claim for costs, however, disallowing $800.03 in itemized costs. 
The Estate then appealed all of the District Court's rulings, including the Final Judg-
ment and the award of attorney's fees and costs (that appeal, #990315-SC, is hereinafter re-
ferred to as Pasquin I). After the Estate filed Pasquin I, however, one Sheri Marion filed, in 
the District Court, a Petition for Determination of Additional Heirs and Demand for N o -
tice in the District Court. Sheri Marion's Petition alleged that her child, Kody Jon Mar ion , 
was also the child and heir of Kory Pasquin. Following negotiations between counsel, all 
three parties stipulated as follows: 1) genetic testing would be performed to determine 
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whether Kory was also Kody's father, using the same laboratory, blood, DNA, and DNA in-
formation ofKory Pasquin that was used to determine that Kory was Karly's natural father; 
2) if the DNA test established that Kory was Kody Marion's natural father, then it would 
serve as "conclusive evidence" that Kory Pasquin was the father of both Karly Madsen and 
Kody Marion; and 3) the Estate would then dismiss its appeal in Pasquin I; and 4) the par-
ties would modify the Final Judgment solely to state that Kody Marion is the natural child 
of Kory Pasquin and an heir entitled to one-third of the Estate (thus, each child would re-
ceive one-third of the estate). The parties filed their Stipulation with the Court. 
The second DNA test established that Kory Pasquin was the natural father of Kody 
Marion. Therefore, the Estate dismissed its appeal in Pasquin L Despite the Stipulation, the 
Estate then filed a petition and several frivolous motions in the District Court attempting to 
convince the District Court to vacate the Final Judgment it had appealed from in Pasquin I, 
and sought to have the District Court reverse its award of Karly's fees and costs. The Estate 
obviously sought to vacate the Final Judgment because it knew it was bound by that judg-
ment, and that it had waived its right to appeal when it dismissed Pasqtdn L Ultimately, the 
District Court denied the Estate's petition and motions, affirming its prior judgment and 
orders, including the award of Karly's attorney's fees and costs. 
On September 21, 2000, the District Court entered an Amended Final Judgment (a-
mended solely to include Kody Marion as an heir of the Estate). The Amended Final 
Judgment incorporated the previous Final Judgment and award of attorney's fees and costs 
to Karly. Despite the Stipulation, the Estate has now filed the present appeal, seeking to re-
litigate issues regarding the award of Karly's attorney's fees and costs. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Some time in 1995, Kristie Madsen became pregnant with Koiy Pasquin's child. Kris-
tie informed Kory that she was pregnant with his child. On February 5, 1996, Kristie 
gave birth to Kory's child, Karly Madsen. (Trial Tr. Vol. 1, 57- 61 (December 1-2, 
1999); R. 817, 57-61). 
2. After Karly's birth, Kory Pasquin told Kristie that he wanted to have genetic testing 
done to determine whether he was Karly's father. Kory and Kristie then went to the 
University of Utah Eccles Institute of Human Genetics, DNA Paternity Testing Labo-
ratory, to give blood samples for the purpose of undergoing genetic testing to deter-
mine paternity. (Trial Tr. Vol. 1, 94-101; R. 817, 94-101). 
3. The DNA tests showed, with an extraordinarily high degree of mathematical certainty 
(99.7%), that Kory Pasquin was Karly's natural father; the test resulted in a paternity 
index of 5021. (Trial Tr. Vol. 2, 289-294; R. 818, 289-294). 
4. Kory Pasquin died on October 26,1996 when he was 28 years old. (R. 1) At the time of 
Kory s death, Kory and Kristie Madsen were living together. (Trial Tr. Vol. 1, 53; R. 
817,53). 
5. At the date of Kory's death, Tori Lynn Pasquin was listed in the official birth records 
as his child. (R.2) Tory is the child Kory Pasquin and one Candace Souter, who was 
one of Kory's former girl friends. (AfE Of Geri Pasquin J 3, R. 104). Thus, it appeared 
that Kory died leaving behind two children. 
6. Candace Souter appeared and filed an Application for Informal Appointment as the 
Personal Representative of the Estate, in which she represented to the Court that her 
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child, Tory Pasquin, was the only child of Kory Pasquin. On March 4, 1997, Third 
District Court Judge Tyrone E. Medley appointed Candace M. Souter, the mother of 
Tory Pasquin, as the personal representative of the Estate of Kory Pasquin. (R. 8). 
7. On April 1, 1997, Kristie Madsen filed a petition claiming that Karly Madsen, as a 
child of Kory Pasquin, had a "property right in or a claim against the decedent's es-
tate. . ." (R. 11). 
8. Although Kristie initially appeared as guardian for Karly, because of drug abuse prob-
lems, Kristie was unable to fulfill her duties and obligations as a single parent for 
Karly. Therefore, she surrendered all of her parental rights to Kristie's mother, Yvette 
Madsen, who has been acting as Karly's parent and guardian. (Trial Tr., Vol. 1, 52; R. 
817, 52). Kristie is currently in drug rehabilitation. 
9. The Estate opposed Karly's Petition, arguing that it was entitled to a trial in which 
Karly had the burden of proving paternity. Judge Medley heard Karly's Petition and 
referred it to the trial calendar of the Hon. Leslie A. Lewis. (R. 38). 
10. Because Ms. Souter had knowingly and intentionally misrepresented to the District 
Court that Tory Pasquin was Kory's only child, Karly filed a motion to remove Can-
dace Souter as personal representative of the estate. In support of her motion, Karly 
filed the affidavits of Geri Pasquin (who is Kory's mother), Julie Flarity (who is Kory's 
half-sister), and Kristie Madsen. All three affidavits contain sworn testimony that: 1) 
all three witnesses knew that Karly was Kory's child; 2) Kory had openly acknowl-
edged to them that Karly was his child; 3) Kory had supported Karly; 4) they knew Ms. 
Souter; and 5) Ms. Souter had misrepresented to the District Court that Tory Pasquin 
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was Kory s only child. (R. 104-109). 
11. In her affidavit, Kory's mother, Geri Pasquin, testified that: 
I have serious concerns about whether Candy Suitter is looking out for the 
interest of all interested persons or whether she is only looking out for her 
own interests and that of her daughter, Tori. Indeed, in my experience, she 
has not exhibited the degree of objectivity and reasonableness one would ex-
pect from a Personal Representative of an Estate". (Aff. Geri Pasquin, 3" 9; R. 
105). 
12. In her affidavit, Julie Flarity testified that she knew both Ms. Souter and Kristie 
Madsen, and that she had welcomed both women and their children into her home. 
Julie testified that she spent many hours caring for both Karly and Tory. (Aff. Julie 
Flarity 5 8; R. 107). Ms. Flarity testified that CCI am very concerned about whether 
Candy Souter is acting in the best interests of both of his children, Tory Pasquin and 
Karly Madsen." (Aff. Julie Flarity f 10; R. 107). 
13. The District Court never ruled on Karly's motion to remove Ms. Souter as personal 
representative of the Estate. 
14. The Estate then argued to the District Court that Karly had to establish paternity at 
trial under the Utah Uniform Act on Paternity, Utah Code §§ 78-45a-l et seq. 
(UUAP) (R. 501). Under the UUAP, the standard of proof in a trial to determine pa-
ternity is "by a preponderance of the evidence." Utah Code § 78-45a-6.5 (1997). 
15. Karly represented to the Gourt that instead of causing Kory's family the emotional 
pain of exhuming Kory Pasquin's body to obtain DNA samples, at trial she would rely 
on the DNA test that had previously determined that Kory was Karly's biological fa-
ther. (R. 411). 
16. The District Court granted the Estate's request for a trial, and scheduled a jury trial to 
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occur on December 1-2,1998. 
17. On January 16, 1998, Karly filed a motion to award her reasonable attorney's fees and 
costs she had incurred and would be forced to incur through trial, thus preserving her 
claim for attorney's fees and costs. (R. 404). 
18. The Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby presided over the jury trial on December 1 and 2, 
1998. (Trial Tr., vol. 1,1; R. 817). 
19. After a two day trial, a jury rendered a verdict that Kory Pasquin was the natural father 
of Karly Madsen and an heir to the Estate. (Trial Tr., Vol. 2, 357-360; R. 818, 375-
360). 
20. On March 2, 1999, the District Court entered its Final Judgment that Karly Madsen is 
an heir of Kory Pasquin's Estate, and that she was thus entitled to one-half of the Es-
tate. The Final Judgment also held that Karly was entitled to an award of reasonable 
attorney's fees and costs incurred in pursuing her petition in an amount to be deter-
mined by the Court (R. 678) A copy of the Final Judgment is attached in the Adden-
dum to this brief. 
21. Therefore, on January 26, 1999 Karly's counsel, David W. Steffensen, filed an affidavit 
regarding Karly's attorney's fees, costs, and witness fees incurred in litigating the pa-
ternity issue. Mr. Steffensen's affidavit detailed the experience of counsel, the hourly 
rate of counsel that was competitive in the community, and the number of hours 
worked on the case. Attached and incorporated into Mr. Steffensen's affidavit was a 
detailed itemized narrative of services rendered, including detailed descriptions of 
work performed, when the work was performed, and time required for each task. (Aff. 
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David W. Steffensen Regarding Attorney's Fees, Costs and Witness Fees (January 25, 
1999); R. 639-650). A copy of Mr. Steffensen's Affidavit is attached in the Addendum 
to this brief. 
22. The District Court reviewed the affidavit of Kariy's counsel, and on April 29, 1999, 
held a hearing regarding Kariy's motion for attorney's fees and costs. During the hear-
ing, the Estate called Karly's counsel as a witness and extensively cross-examined him 
under oath. The District then heard oral argument regarding the motion. Ultimately, 
the District Court awarded Karly attorney s fees of $41,212.50 and costs of $3,933.25. 
The District Court denied Karly $800.03 of her itemized costs. (Order Awarding At-
torney s Fees (August 24, 1999); R. 801-804). A copy of the Order is attached in the 
Addendum to this brief. 
23. The Estate filed a Notice of Appeal firom the Final Judgment on March 31, 1999, ap-
pealing all aspects of the District Court's rulings, including the award of Karly's attor-
ney's fees and costs. (R. 686) 
24. After the Estate filed its appeal one Sheri Marion filed, in the District Court, a Petition 
for Determination of Additional Heirs and Demand for Notice in the District Court. 
Sheri Marion's Petition alleged that her minor child, Kody Jon Marion, was also the 
natural child and heir of Kory Pasquin. (R. 695) 
25. Therefore, following negotiations between counsel, the parties stipulated as follows: 1) 
a DNA test would be performed to determine whether Kory was also Kody's father, 
using the same blood, DNA, and DNA information of Kory Pasquin that was used to 
conclusively determine that Kory was Karly's natural father; 2) if the test was positive, 
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the parties would add Kody Marion as an heir of the Estate; 3) if the DNA test estab-
lished that Kory was Kody Marion's natural father, then it would serve as "conclusive 
evidence" that Kory Pasquin was the father of both Karly Madsen and Kody Marion; 
4) the Estate would then dismiss its appeal from the Final Judgment; and 5) the parties 
would modify the Final Judgment to state that Kody Marion is the natural child of 
Kory Pasquin and an heir of the Estate. The parties filed the Stipulation with the Court 
on January 3, 2000. (R. 808-810) (the "Stipulation"). A copy of the Stipulation is at-
tached in the Addendum to this brief. 
26. The DNA test proved that Kory Pasquin was, indeed, the natural father of Kody 
Marion. Therefore, the Estate filed Estate of Kory Pasquin's Notice of DNA Test Re-
sults and Recognition of Heirs, which gave notice that Karly was a child and heir of 
Kory Pasquin. (R. 842) 
27. Therefore, the Estate dismissed its appeal from the Final Judgment (R. 820) 
28. Recognizing that it was bound by the terms of the Stipulation and the Final Judgment, 
the Estate then began an extensive battle to avoid the judgment and its award of 
Karly's attorney's fees. The Estate filed, in the District Court, a Petition to Vacate Final 
Judgment, and brought several frivolous motions in the District Court in an attempt 
to convince the Court to vacate the Final Judgment and rescind its award of Karly's at-
torney s fees. (R. 822-824). 
29. Ultimately, on July 27, 2000, the District Court issued an order entitled "Court's Rul-
ing." The Court's Ruling denied the Estate's Petition to vacate the final judgment, and 
stated: 
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After again carefully reviewing the record, the Court agrees with Ms. Madsen 
that the issue of attorney's fees has clearly been adjudicated in her favor. 
Moreover, after reviewing the basis for this award, the Court remains con-
vinced that it was proper in the first place. The Court is not inclined nor is 
there a legal basis to revisit the issue of attorney's fees. 
Court's Ruling, 2-3 (July 27, 2000); R. 937, 938-939). The Court entered the Amended Final 
Judgment on September 26, 2000, which included Kody Marion as an heir. Thus, after con-
sidering the evidence, two District Court judges (Judges Cornaby and Lewis) separately 
reached the same conclusion that the award of Karly's attorney's fees and costs was reason-
able. 
30. The Estate then filed a Notice of Appeal on October 17, 2000, appealing the award of 
Karly's attorney's fees. 
31. Although the Estate has always argued that Karly's attorney's fees of $41,212.50 were 
unreasonable, the Estate filed in the District Court a Petition to Dispose of Estate 
Property, dated June 7, 1999. The Petition revealed that John Pasquin, Kory's father, 
had been paying the Estate's legal fees and costs, which amounted to $40,023.00. (Pet. 
Dispose Estate Prop., 2, R. 760, 761, 764). Thus, Kory's father was fueling the battle to 
block Karly's claim to her share of the Estate. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
On -appeal, the Estate argues that this Court should reverse the District Court's award of 
Karly's attorney's fees, and argues two issues: 1) there is purportedly no statutory basis for 
the award of attorney's fees; and 2) the District Court failed to enter findings of fact and 
conclusions of law to support the award of Karly's attorney's fees. However, the Estate also 
argues a number of other issues that are scattered throughout its brief in random order. 
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The Court should reject the Estate's arguments, and affirm the District Court's rulings 
and the award of attorney's fees and costs to Karly for the following reasons: 
1. This Court has no jurisdiction to hear this appeal because the Estate did not file its ap-
peal within thirty days of the entry of the Final Judgment in this matter as required by 
Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure; 
2. The Estate's appeal is barred by the terms of the Stipulation. 
3. There is explicit statutory authority for the award of Karly's attorney's fees; 
4. The Estate's appeal is barred by the doctrine of estoppel; 
5. The Estate's appeal is barred by the doctrine of waiver; 
6. The Estate's appeal is barred by the doctrine of quasi-estoppel; 
7. The Estate's appeal is barred by the doctrine of judicial estoppel; 
8. The Estate failed to raise the lack of findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding 
the award of attorney's fees at the District Court level, and is thus barred from raising 
it on appeal for the first time; 
9. Findings of fact and conclusions of law are implicit in the District Court's award of 
attorney's fees and costs to Karly. Judge Cornaby, after reviewing written testimony 
and evidence, and after presiding over a hearing, held Karly's attorney's fees and costs 
to be reasonable and entered an order awarding her the fees. Moreover, Judge Lewis 
carefully reviewed the evidence considered by Judge Cornaby, and issued a written 
ruling upholding the award of attorney's fees; and 
10. Karly's attorney's fees were reasonable. 
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ARGUMENT 
1. This Court has no jurisdiction to hear this appeal because the Estate did not file its 
appeal within thirty days of the entry of the Final Judgment in this matter as required 
by Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
The District Court entered the Final Judgment awarding Karly her attorney's fees and costs 
on March 22, 1999. The Estate filed its Notice of Appeal in the present action on October 
17, 2000, one year and seven months after the District Court entered its Final judgment. 
Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires that a notice of appeal must be 
filed within 30 days of the date the District Court enters judgment or order appealed from. 
Therefore, because the Notice of Appeal was not filed within 30 days of the date of the Final 
Judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the Estate's appeal, and the Court should 
dismiss the Estate's appeal. 
2. The Estate's appeal is barred by the terms of the Stipulation. 
Under Utah law, stipulations are conclusive and binding on the parties.1 "Ordinarily, courts 
are bound by the stipulations of the parties."2 Therefore, the Estate is bound by the terms of 
the Stipulation. 
Under the clear and unambiguous terms of the Stipulation, if genetic testing proved 
that Kody Marion was Kory's child, the results were to be taken as "conclusive evidence" 
that Karly is the natural child of Kory, "therefore determining once and for all that Kody 
1
 Maxwell v. Maxwell, 796 P.2d 403, 406 (Utah App. 1990); Higley v. McDonald, 685 P.2d 
496,499 (Utah 1984); Dove v. Cude, 710 P.2d 170,171 (Utah 1985). 
2
 First Denver Mortgage Investors v. Zundel, 600 P.2d 521, 527 (Utah 1979). 
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Marion and Karly Madsen are heirs to the estate of Kory Pasquin." Stipulation 5" 2 (Decem-
ber 23, 1999). Furthermore, in such case, the Estate was required to dismiss its appeal in 
Pasquin L If the Estate wanted to appeal the Final Judgment and award of Karly's attorney s 
fees, it could have proceeded with Pasquin I. Instead, the Estate chose to enter into the 
Stipulation. Karly relied on the Estate's agreement to dismiss its appeal when she entered 
into the Stipulation—the sole further action to be the amendment of the Final Judgment to 
include Kody as an heir. 
The genetic testing proved that Kody Marion is the child of Kory Pasquin. Therefore, 
it was conclusively determined that Karly is Kory's child, and an heir of the Estate. The Es-
tate then dismissed its appeal in Pasquin L 
Notwithstanding the Stipulation, in Appellant's Brief the Estate attempts to resurrect 
the issue of paternity, extensively briefing the evidence Karly introduced at trial, and focus-
ing primarily on the paternity issue. The Estate argues that Karly did not comply with the 
requirements for genetic testing under Utah Code § 78-45a-10 (1997), and that she failed to 
provide sufficient foundation for the genetic testing that she relied on at trial. The Estate's 
lengthy recitation of the procedure, evidence, and testimony at trial is irrelevant to the pre-
sent appeal, however, because the Stipulation renders all of these issues moot. Pursuant to 
the Stipulation, it has now been conclusively established that Karly is the natural child of 
Kory Pasquin. There is simply no issue regarding paternity, nor is there any issue as to 
whether Karly's evidence satisfied the requirements of the Utah Uniform Paternity Act. 
The Estate abandoned its appeal in Pasquin I. The terms of the Stipulation bar the Es-
tate's present appeal and its attempt to revive issues of paternity. Therefore, this Court 
22 
should reject the Estate's arguments, and affirm the District Court's rulings. 
3. There is a statutory basis for the award of Karly's attorney's fees and costs. 
Even though there was a DNA test that proved that Kory Pasquin was Karly's father, under 
Utah Code § 78-45a-10 (1997), the Estate objected to the DNA test that proved that Kory 
Pasquin was Karly's father. The Estate insisted that it had the right to a trial at which Karly 
had to establish paternity under the Utah Uniform Act on Paternity (R. 501). Therefore, the 
District Court held a jury trial, the governing law being the UUAP, which resulted in a jury 
verdict that Kory Pasquin was Karly's father. The UUAP explicitly provides for the award of 
attorney's fees, witness fees, and costs upon a judgment of paternity. Utah Code § 78-45a-
5(4) (1997).3 Therefore, there is a clear and unambiguous statutory basis for the District 
Court's award of Karly's attorney's fees and costs, and this Court should affirm the rulings 
of the District Court. 
4. The Doctrine of estoppel bars the Estate from bringing this appeal. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that a party is estopped from asserting a legal position if 
the following three elements are present: 
(i) a statement, admission, act, or failure to act by one party inconsistent with 
a claim later asserted; (ii) reasonable action or inaction by the other party 
taken or not taken on the basis of the first party's statement, admission, act, 
or failure to act; and (iii) injury to the second party that would result from al-
lowing the first party to contradict or repudiate such statement, admission, 
act, or failure to act.4 
3
 "The Court may enter an order awarding costs, attorney fees, and witness fees in the man-
ner prescribed in Section 30-3-3 upon a judgment or acknowledgment of paternity." Utah 
Code §78-45a-5(4) (1997). 
4
 S&G, Inc. v. Intermountain Power Agency, 913 P.2d 735, 741-42 (Utah 1996), quoting 
CECO v. Concrete Specialists, Inc., 772 P.2d 967, 969-70 (Utah 1989). 
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All three of the elements of estoppel are present in the Estate's appeal First, in the 
Stipulation, the Estate agreed to withdraw its first appeal if DNA testing proved that Kory 
Pasquin was the father of Kody Marion. Second, Karly took action by agreeing to the terms 
of the stipulation if it contained a provision for dismissal of Pasquin I, and Karly agreed to 
modification of the Final Judgment only if the Estate's appeal was dismissed. Third, Karly is 
suffering injury by allowing the Estate to proceed with the present appeal. Karly is being 
forced to incur substantial additional attorney's fees in connection with the appeal, and she 
is forced to litigate an issue which was resolved by stipulation. Therefore, the Estate's appeal 
is barred by the doctrine of estoppel, and the Court should affirm the District Court's rul-
ings. 
5. The doctrine of waiver bars the Estate from bringing this appeal. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that the doctrine of waiver is the "intentional relin-
quishment of a known right," which occurs when three elements are present: "(1) an exist-
ing right, benefit, or advantage; (2) knowledge of its existence; and (3) an intention to re-
linquish the right."5 The Estate is barred by the doctrine of waiver because all three elements 
of the doctrine are present in this case. 
First, in the Stipulation, the Estate intentionally and knowingly relinquished an exist-
ing right to appeal the award of attorney's fees and costs—in fact, the Estate was pursuing 
its rights in Pasquin I when it entered into the Stipulation, and the Estate voluntarily dis-
missed that appeal. Thus, there was the existence of a right, knowledge of its existence, and 
an intention to relinquish that right. As the Utah Court of Appeals has said: 
5
 Soterslnc. v. DeseretFederal Savings & Loan Ass'n, 857 P.2d 935, 939-40 (Utah 1993). 
24 
Generally in legal proceedings a party with knowledge of all the facts will not 
be allowed to take a position, pursue that position to fruition, and later, with 
no substantial change in circumstances, return to attack the validity of the 
prior position or the outcome flowing from it6 
Therefore, the Estate's appeal is barred by the doctrine of waiver, and the Court 
should affirm the District Court's rulings. 
6. The doctrine of quasi-estoppei bars the Estate from bringing this appeal*. 
The doctrine of quasi-estoppel bars a party from changing its position in litigation when "it 
appeals to the conscience of the court to prevent injustice by precluding a party from 
asserting a right inconsistent with a position previously taken by him."7 The doctrine of 
quasi-estoppel "was developed to prevent a party from retaining a benefit by asserting a po-
sition to the disadvantage of another and then asserting a right which is inconsistent with 
that previous position."8 Quasi-estoppel operates to bar a party from asserting inconsistent 
positions when the party (1) with knowledge of the facts (2) takes a position inconsistent 
with its former position (3) to the disadvantage of another.9 Under the doctrine of quasi-
estoppel, "where one having the right to accept or reject a transaction or instrument takes 
6
 Occidental/Nebraska Federal Savings Bank v. Mehr, 791 P.2d 217, 220 (Utah App. 1990); 
citing28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel and Waiver § § 68-70 (1966). 
7
 Willard v. Ward, 875 P.2d 441, 443 (Okla. Ct. App. 1994), citing Jamison v. Consolidated 
Utilities, Inc., 576 P.2d 97, 102 (Alaska 1978)). See also Sailes v. Jones, 499 P.2d 721, 724 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1972), reh'd denied (quoting Unruh v. Industrial Comm'n, 301 P.2d 1029, 
1031 (Ariz. 1956)); Pattisonv. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 495 P.2d975, 980 (Kan. 1972). 
8Keesee v. Fetzek, 723 P.2d 904, 905 (Idaho Ct. App. 1986). 
9
 See Steubner Realty 19, Ltd v. Cravens Rd. 88, Ltd., 817 S.W.2d 160, 164 (Tex. App. 1991) 
(citing Stimpson v. Piano Indep. School Dist, 743 S.W.2d 944, 946 (Tex. App. 1987, writ de-
nied)', 31 C.J.S. Estoppel § 107 (1964)). 
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and retains benefits thereunder, he ratifies it, and cannot avoid its obligation or effect by 
taking a position inconsistent with it." 
The elements of quasi-estoppel are present in this appeal. In the Stipulation, the Estate 
agreed to dismiss its appeal, and Karly entered into the Stipulation in reliance upon the Es-
tate's promise to dismiss its appeal. The Estate did dismiss Pasquin L However, the Estate 
now wishes to renew its appeal, to the disadvantage of Karly Madsen. Therefore, the doc-
trine of quasi-estoppel bars the Estate's present appeal, and this Court should and affirm 
the rulings of the District Court. 
7. The Doctrine of judicial estoppel bars the Estate from bringing this appeal. 
Under the doctrine of judicial estoppel, a "person may not, to the prejudice of another per-
son deny any position taken in a prior judicial proceeding between the same persons or 
their privies involving the same subject-matter, if such prior position is successfully main-
tained."11 In the Stipulation entered while Pasquin I was pending, the Estate took the posi-
tion that if a DNA test proved that Kody Marion was Kory Pasquin's child, then that test 
would serve as "conclusive evidence" that Karly Madsen was Kory's child. The Estate also 
took the position that it would then dismiss its appeal in Pasquin I. 
Nonetheless, the Estate has revived its appeal, and argues issues regarding paternity 
and the award of Karly5 s attorney's fees and costs. The doctrine of judicial estoppel bars this 
appeal, which is inconsistent with the Stipulation in the prior proceeding. Therefore, this 
Carolina Medicorp, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of North Carolina Teachers1 and State Em-
ployees' Comprehensive Major Med. Plan, 456 S.E.2d 116,120 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995). 
11
 Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline, 913 P.2d 731, 734 (Utah 1996); see also Salt Lake City 
v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp., 5 P.3d 1206, 1222 (Utah 2000). 
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Court should affirm the District Court's rulings. 
8. The Estate's appeal is barred because it failed to raise the lack of findings of fact and 
conclusions of law regarding the award of attorney's fees at the District Court level. 
The Estate argues that this Court should reverse the District Court's award of Karly's attor-
ney's fees and costs because the District Court did not enter findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law regarding the fee award. However, the Court's Order Awarding Attorney s 
Fees, Costs, and Witness Fees contains an extensive and detailed recitation of the facts, tes-
timony, pleadings, papers, hearing, and arguments upon which it based its decision to 
award Karly her fees. Thus, although the District Court did not caption its Order as "Find-
ings of Fact and Conclusions of Law," the Order contains the substance that would be con-
tained in findings. 
Moreover, at the trial level, the Estate vigorously opposed the award of Karly's fees, 
and argued the matter to two District Court judges, who both found the fees to be reason-
able. Thus, the Estate had ample opportunity to request the entry of findings of fact, but it 
did not do so. If the Estate had made such a request, the District Court could have obliged 
the Estate by entering a separate document captioned "Findings of Fact." However, it is in 
this appeal that the Estate raises the issue of findings for the first time. 
It is axiomatic that this Court will not consider issues that can be raised at the trial 
court level, but are raised for the first time on appeal.12 The rule against considering new is-
12
 See, e.g., Espinalv. Salt Lake City Bd OfEduc, 797 P.2d412, 413 (Utah 1990); Progressive 
Acquisition, Inc. v. Lytle, 806 P.2d 239, 242 (Utah App. 1991); Ringwood v. Foreign Auto 
Works, Inc., 786 P.2d 1350, 1358 (Utah App.), cert denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990); 
Shire Dev. v. Frontier Invs., 799 P.2d 221, 224 (Utah App. 1990); Werner-Jacob sen v. Bed-
narik, 946 P.2d 744, 748 (Utah App. 1997); Certified Sur. Group, Ltd. v. UT Inc., 960 P.2d 
904, 906 (Utah 1998). 
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sues on appeal is ancientb Judge Ruggero Aldisert of the Court of Appeals of the Third Cir-
cuit has succinctly stated the rationale for the continued application of the ancient rule in 
modern practice. Judge Aldisert has said that the reasons for the rule: 
[G]o to the heart of the common law tradition and the adversary system. It 
affords an opportunity for correction and avoidance in the trial court in vari-
ous ways: it gives the adversary the opportunity either to avoid the challenged 
action or to present a reasoned defense of the trial court's action; and it pro-
vides the trial court with the alternative of altering or modifying a decision or of 
ordering a more fully developed record for review, (emphasis added). 
If an appellate court were to deviate from this ancient rule, it would inject a degree of 
uncertainty into the law that is detrimental to our system of justice, and weaken the pre-
dictability that is an important part of appellate review. Without this predictability, appel-
late review is degraded into a process in which appellants attempt to relitigate the issues and 
to persuade the appellate court that the trial court did not reach the "right" result. Thus, 
every appeal would become a de novo proceeding in which the appellate court holds a trial 
on the merits. This is exactly what the Estate attempts to do in the present appeal. 
Rule 46 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure embodies the rationale for the ancient 
rule against considering new issues on appeal. Rule 46 requires a party, "at the time the rul-
13
 R. Martineau, Modern Appellate Practice: Federal and State Civil Appeals § 1.1 (1983); R. 
Pound, Appellate Procedure in Civil Cases, 38-71 (1941); C. Warren, A History of the Ameri-
can Bar 39-324 (1911 & reprint 1980); Martineau, The Value of Appellate Oral Argument: A 
Challenge to the Conventional Wisdom, 72 Iowa L. Rev. 1-11 (1986); Sunderland, Improve-
ment of Appellate Procedure, 26 IowaL. Rev. 3, 7-12 (1940). 
14
 Pfeifer v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp, 678 F.2d 453, 456-457 n.l (3d Cir. 1982), vacated 
and remanded, 462 U.S. 523 (1983). 
28 
ing or order of the court is made or sought/' to make "known to the court the action which 
he desires the Court to take or his objection to the action of the court and his grounds 
therefore...." The Estate failed to comply with Rule 46 by not requesting that the District 
Court enter findings of fact and conclusions of law when the Court entered its order re-
garding the award of Karly's attorney's fees and costs. 
Therefore, this Court should enforce Rule 46, adhere to the ancient rule against con-
sidering new issues on appeal, and affirm the District Court's award of Karly's attorney's 
fees and costs. 
9. Findings of fact and conclusions of law are implicit in the District Court's award of 
Karly's attorney's fees and costs. 
Although the District Court did not enter a document entitled "Findings of Fact and Con-
clusions of Law" regarding the award of Karly's attorney's fees and costs, findings "can be 
implied if it is reasonable to assume that the trial court actually considered the controverted 
evidence and necessarily made a finding".15 The Court should imply findings in the District 
Court's award of Karly's attorney's fees for the following reasons: 
1. Karly's counsel submitted a detailed affidavit setting forth his hourly rate and the 
hourly rates of those who assisted him with the case, which were similar to the rates 
charged by similar attorneys for similar services in Salt Lake City; 
2. The affidavit of Karly's counsel included a detailed itemized description of all work 
performed on the paternity case, including a description of what work was performed 
and the time spent on each task; 
See, e.g., Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1025 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
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The affidavit of Karly's counsel included only time and costs spent on the paternity 
litigation; explicitly omitted were some of Karl/s attorney's fees, which were related 
only to the probate litigation and not related to the paternity litigation; 
At the Estate's request, Judge Cornaby presided over a hearing regarding Karly's mo-
tion for attorney's fees and costs, and at the hearing the Estate called Karly's counsel, 
David W. Steffensen, as its only witness, subjecting Mr. Steffensen to extensive cross-
examination regarding Karly's attorney's fees and costs; 
Judge Cornaby heard oral argument from both Karly's counsel and the Estate regard-
ing Karly's motion for attorney's fees and costs; 
The Estate introduced no evidence or expert witness testimony to controvert the affi-
davit and oral testimony of Karly's counsel regarding her fees; 
At the April 29, 1999 hearing, Judge Cornaby ruled that Karly was entided to her at-
torney's fees and most of her costs. In the Order Awarding Attorney's Fees, Costs, and 
Witness Fees to Karly, 1-2 (August 24, 1999), the District Court explicitiy identified 
the extensive material upon which it relied in making its award: 
[Hjaving reviewed Petitioner, Karly Madsen's, Motion to Award Attorney's 
Fees and Costs, Petitioners Memorandum in Support thereof, the Affidavit of 
David W. Steffensen Regarding Attorney's Fees, Costs, and Witness Ex-
penses, The Estate's Consolidated Response to Pending Trial and Discovery 
Motions, the Estate's Request for Hearing on Pending Trial and Discovery 
Motions, the Estate's Memorandum in Opposition to Karly Madsen's Mo-
tion for Attorney's Fees, Petitioner's Reply Memorandum to the Estate's 
Consolidated Response to Pending Trial and Discovery Motions, Petitioner's 
Reply Memorandum to the Estate's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion 
for Attorney's Fees, the Final Judgment, the other pleadings in this matter, 
having further received sworn testimony from David W. Steffensen at the 
hearing held on the Motion on April 29, 1999, who was cross examined 
thereon by counsel for the Decedent's Estate, and having further heard and 
considered the arguments of counsel for Petitioner, Karly Madsen, and for 
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the Decedent's Estate at said hearing held on the Motion on April 29, 1999, 
and good cause appearing therefore . . . 
8. The August 24,1999 Order itemizes each cost awarded to Karly; 
9. After the Estate dismissed its first appeal, it brought in the District Court a Petition to 
Vacate Final Judgment, seeking a reversal of the award of Karly's fees and costs. Judge 
Leslie Lewis issued a ruling denying the Estate's Petition, and stated: 
After again carefully reviewing the record, the Court agrees with Ms. Madsen 
that the issue of attorney's fees has clearly been adjudicated in her favor. 
Moreover, after reviewing the basis for this award, the Court remains con-
vinced that it was proper in the first place. The Court is not inclined nor is 
there a legal basis to revisit the issue of attorney's fees. 
Court's Ruling, 2-3 (July 27,2000)(R. 937, 938-939). 
10. Thus, after considering the written evidence, all of the papers filed by the parties, hear-
ing witness testimony, and hearing the oral arguments of the parties, two District 
Court judges (Judges Cornaby and Lewis) separately reached the same conclusion 
that the award of Karly's attorney's fees and costs was reasonable. 
It is indisputable that the District Court considered all of the evidence in the record 
regarding attorney's fees and costs—Karly's evidence being uncontroverted by the Estate, 
which submitted no evidence at all. It is thus reasonable to assume that the District Court 
necessarily made findings supporting its award of Karly's attorney's fees and costs. There-
fore, this Court should imply findings of fact and conclusions of law, and affirm the District 
Court's award of Karly's attorney's fees and costs. 
10. The award of Karly's attorney's fees and costs was reasonable. 
Rule 24(5) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires a party to provide, under 
appropriate headings, "a statement of the issues presented for review, including for each 
issue: the standard of appellate review with supporting authority." In Appellant's Brief, the 
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the standard of appellate review with supporting authority." In Appellant's Brief, the Estate 
identifies only two issues on appeal. The Estate does not identify the reasonableness of the 
award of Karly's attorney's fees as an issue on appeal. Nonetheless, the Estate argues, at 
great length, that the fee award was unreasonable. Because the Estate did not comply with 
Rule 24(5) in raising the reasonableness issue, this Court should not consider the issue. 
However, Karly will briefly address the reasonableness issue in the event that the Court 
does consider the Estate's argument 
The Estate argues that preparing for and trying the paternity case should have cost "no 
more than $5,000." (Appellant's Brief at 16). Yet Karly was required to incur substantially 
more in legal fees because the Estate has employed an endless series of complex legal tactics 
that constitute conduct perhaps exceeded only by that of the poisoning princes of the 
Medici family in Renaissance Italy. Kory Pasquin's father, determined to keep Karly from 
her rightful inheritance, personally incurred over $40,000 in attorney's fees on behalf of the 
Estate, and has asked that the Estate reimburse him for those fees. Thus, the fees the Estate 
has incurred in simply defending the case were substantially the same as the fees incurred 
by Karly, even though it was Karly who bore the burden of proving paternity. Therefore, it 
is ludicrous for the Estate to argue that Karly's fees are unreasonable. 
Moreover, the Affidavit of David W. Steffensen regarding Karly's attorney's fees and 
costs, and the testimony during the hearing on the attorney's fees issues, prove that the Dis-
trict Court must have considered the following: 
L The legal work that Karly's counsel actually performed; 
2. The legal work Karly's counsel performed was reasonably necessary to adequately 
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prosecute the matter; 
3. Karly's counsel had a billing rate consistent with the rates customarily charged in 
Salt Lake City, Utah, for similar services; and 
4. That there were circumstances that required consideration of additional factors, in-
cluding those listed in Rule LI of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particu-
larly: 
a. The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions in-
volved and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; Utah Code 
of Professional Responsibility, R. 1.5(a)(1); 
b. The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; Utah 
Code of Professional Responsibility, R. 1.5(a)(3); 
c. The amount involved and the results obtained; Utah Code of Professional 
Responsibility, R. 1.5(a)(4); 
d. The ability of the lawyers representing Karly Madsen; Utah Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility, R. 1.5(a)(7). 
Thus, the evidence presented to the District Court presented the factors required by the 
Utah Supreme Court in Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 992 (Utah 1988). There-
fore, this Court should affirm the District Court's rulings. 
CONCLUSION 
The Estate raises only two issues on appeal. The Court should reject the Estate's ar-
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guments regarding both issues. Notwithstanding the Estate's argument to the contrary, 
there is a clear and unambiguous statute that provides for the recovery of attorney s fees, 
costs, and witness fees in paternity actions. Moreover, the District Court's orders awarding 
attorney's fees were detailed enough to serve as findings of fact, and the Estate has waived 
its right to challenge the alleged lack of findings by failing to raise the issue at the District 
Court level. In addition, this Court should impute findings of fact in the District Court's 
order awarding attorney's fees and costs. Thus, the Court should affirm the District Court's 
rulings. 
DATED this /$" day of Tune, 2001. 
Richard L. King 
Counsel for Appellees 
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ADDENDUM 
Utah Code §§ 78-45a-2 through 78-45a-10 (1997). 
Final Judgment (March 2,1999). 
Affidavit of David W. Steffensen Regarding Attorney's Fees, Costs and Witness Fees 
(January 26,1999). 
Order Awarding Attorney's Fees (August 24,1999). 
Stipulation (January 3,2000). 
PART 1 
78^45a-2 JUDICIAL CODE 126 
78-45a-2. Determinat ion of paterni ty — Effect — Enforce-
ment. 
(1) Paternity may be determined upon: 
(a) the petition of the mother, child, putative father, or the Office of 
Recovery Services; or 
(b) a voluntary declaration of paternity executed in accordance with 
Title 78, Chapter 45e, Voluntary Declaration of Paternity Act. 
(2) If paternity has been determined or has been acknowledged according to 
the laws of this state or any other state, the liabilities of the father may be 
enforced in the same or other proceedings by: 
(a) the mother, child, the Office of Recovery Services, or the public 
authority that has furnished or may furnish the reasonable expenses of 
pregnancy, confinement, education, necessary support, or funeral ex-
penses; and 
(b) other persons including private agencies to the extent that they 
have furnished the reasonable expenses of pregnancy, confinement, edu-
cation, necessary support, or funeral expenses. 
(3) An adjudication of paternity or a voluntary declaration executed in 
accordance with Title 78, Chapter 45e, Voluntary Declaration of Paternity Act, 
shall be filed with the state registrar in accordance with Section 26-2-5. 
(4) A party to an action under this chapter has a continuing obligation to 
keep the court informed of the party's current address. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 2; 1990, ch. of Recovery Services" for "public authority 
245, § 23; 1994, ch. 127, § 2; 1997, ch. 232, chargeable by law with the support of the child" 
§ 74. m Subsection (l)(a); added "the Office of Recov-
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend- ery Services" in Subsection (2)(a); and added 
ment, effective July 1, 1997 substituted "Office Subsections (3) and (4). 
78-45a-5. Remedies. 
(1) The district court has jurisdiction of an action to establish paternity. All 
remedies for enforcement of judgments for expenses of pregnancy and confine-
ment for a wife or for education, necessary support, or funeral expenses for 
legitimate children shall apply The court has continuing jurisdiction to modify 
or revoke a judgment for future education and necessary support. All remedies 
under Title 78, Chapter 45f, Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, are 
available for enforcement of duties of support under this chapter. 
(2) (a) The obligee may enforce his right of support against the obligor and 
the state may proceed on behalf of the obligee or in its own behalf, 
pursuant to the provisions of Title 62A, Chapter 11, Recovery Services, to 
enforce that right of support against the obligor. 
(b) The provisions of Title 62A, Chapter 11, Recovery Services, apply in 
all actions by the state. 
(c) Whenever the state commences an action under this chapter, it shall 
be the duty of the attorney general or the county attorney of the county 
where the obligee resides to represent the state. Neither the attorney 
general nor the county attorney represents or has an attorney-client 
relationship with the obligee or the obligor, in carrying out his responsi-
bilities under this chapter. 
(3) Upon motion by a party, the court shall issue a temporary order in a 
paternity action to require the payment of child support pending a determi-
nation of paternity if there is clear and convincing evidence of paternity in the 
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form of genetic test results under Section 78-45a-7 or 78-45a-10, or 
evidence. 
(4) The court may enter an order awarding costs, attorney fees, and w 
fees in the manner prescribed by Section 30-3-3 upon a judgment or ack 
edgment of paternity. 
(5) Rule 55, Default Judgment, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, app] 
paternity actions commenced under this chapter. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 5; 1975, ch. 96, port Act" for "Title 77, Chapter 31, L 
§ 24; 1990, ch. 183, § 60; 1992, ch. 160, § 2; Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Ac 
1993, ch. 137, § 16; 1994, ch. 140, § 16; 1997, substituted "chapter" for "act"; in Sub 
ch. 232, § 75. (2)(a) substituted "state" for "Departn 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend- Human Services"; substituted "state" f 
ment, effective July 1, 1997, in the last sen- partment" throughout Subsections (2)( 
tence of Subsection (1) substituted "Title 78, (2)(c); added Subsection (3) and made J 
Chapter 45f, Uniform Interstate Family Sup- redesignations; and made stylistic chan' 
78-45a-6.5. Standard of proof. 
The standard of proof in a trial to determine paternity is "by a prepo 
ance of the evidence." 
History: C. 1953, 78-45a-6.5, enacted by ment, effective July 1, 1997, rewrote tl 
L. 1988, ch. 93, § 1; 1997, ch. 232, § 76. tion. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend-
78-45a-7. Authority for genetic test ing. 
(1) Upon motion of any party to the action, made at a time so as not to < 
the proceedings unduly, the court shall order the mother, the child, an< 
alleged father to submit to genetic testing if the request is supported 
sworn statement by the requesting party: 
(a) alleging paternity and setting forth facts establishing a reasor 
possibility of the requisite sexual contact between the parties; or 
(b) denying paternity and setting forth facts establishing a reasor 
possibility of the nonexistence of sexual contact between the parties 
(2) The court may, upon its own initiative, order the mother, the child, 
the alleged father to submit to genetic testing. 
(3) (a) The court shall order genetic testing: 
(i) of a type generally acknowledged as reliable by accredit* 
bodies designated by the federal Secretary of Health and Hu 
Services; and 
(ii) to be performed by a laboratory approved by such an ace 
tation body, 
(b) Except as provided in Subsection (6), the cost of genetic testing < 
be paid by the party who requested it or shared between the parti 
requested by the court, subject to recoupment against the party 
challenges the existence or nonexistence of paternity if the result oi 
genetic test is contrary to the position of the challenger. 
(4) Upon request by a party, a court may order a second genetic test 
complies with Subsection (3) if paid for in advance by the requesting party 
requested within 15 days of the result of the first genetic test being sent tc 
last-known address on file under Section 78-45a-2. 
(5) If any party refuses to submit to genetic testing, the court may res 
the question of paternity against that party, or may enforce its order if 
rights of others and the interests of justice so require. 
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(6) The office may request genetic testing under this section and shall pay 
)r genetic testing it requests subject to recoupment as provided in Section 
2A-11-304 1 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, <j 7; 1992, ch. Subsection (1), added Subsections (l)(a) and 
0, <j 3; 1997, ch. 232, § 77. (1Kb), deleted "or upon request made by or on 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend- behalf of any person whose blood is involved** 
nt, effective July 1, 1997 added uif the re- after "initiative" in Subsection (2), added Sub-
est is supported by a sworn statement by the sections (3), (4), and (6) and made related 
niesting party" in the opening paragraph of redesignations; and made stylistic changes 
l-45a-8, 78-45a-9. Repealed. 
tepeals. — Laws 1997, ch 232, § 141 re- selection and compensation of experts, effective 
Is §§ 78~45a-8 and 78-45a-9, as enacted by July 1, 1997 
/s 1965, ch 158, §§ 8 and 9, relating to 
-45a-10. Effect of genetic test results. 
L) Genetic test results shall be admissible as evidence of paternity without 
need for foundation testimony or other proof of authenticity or accuracy if 
(a) of a type generally acknowledged as reliable by accreditation bodies 
designated by the federal Secretary of Health and Human Services; 
(b) performed by a laboratory approved by such an accreditation body; 
and 
(c) not objected to with particularity and in writing within 15 days after 
the written test results being sent to the parties. 
) (a) Upon a motion of a party, a court may receive testimony from genetic 
testing experts and others involved in conducting the genetic tests if the 
testimony-
(0 is based on a genetic test performed in accordance with Subsec-
tion 78-45a-7(3)(a) or 78-45a-7(4); and 
(n) is useful to the court in determining paternity, 
(b) Unless a party objects with particularity and in writing withm 15 
lays after the written test results are sent to the last-known address of 
hat party on file under Section 78-45a-2, testimony received under 
Subsection (2)(a) shall be in affidavit form. 
(a) A man is presumed to be the natural father of a child if genetic 
estmg results in a paternity index of at least 150. 
(b) A presumption under Subsection (3)(a) may only be rebutted by a 
econd genetic test: 
d) that complies with Subsection 78-45a-7(4); and 
(ii) results m an exclusion. 
If a presumption of paternity established under Subsection (1) is not 
ted by a second genetic test under Subsection (2), the court shall issue an 
establishing paternity 
Bills for pregnancy, childbirth, and genetic testing are admissible as 
ice without requiring third-party foundation testimony and shall consti-
nma facie evidence of amounts incurred for such services or for testing 
lalf of the child. 
>ry: C. 1953, 78-45a-10, enacted by L. as amended by Laws 1992, ch. 160, § 4, pre-
h. 232, ^ 78. scribing the effect of genetic test results, and 
als and Reenactments. — Laws enacts the present section, effective July 1, 
i 232, § 78 repeals former § 78-45a-10, 1997 
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78-45a-11.5. Social security number in court records. 
The social security number of any individual who is subject to a patern 
determination shall be placed in the records relating to the matter. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45a-11.5, enacted by Effective Dates. — Laws 1997, ch. 2 
L. 1997, ch. 232, § 79. § 142 makes the act effective on July 1, 19 
CHAPTER 45e 
VOLUNTARY DECLARATION OF 
PATERNITY 
Section Section 
78-45e-2. Voluntary declaration of pater- 78-45e-3. Requirements for filing. 
nity. 78-45e-4. Rescission of the declaration. 
78-45e-2. Voluntary declarat ion of paternity. 
(1) (a) A voluntary declaration of paternity filed in compliance with th 
chapter establishes a father-child relationship identical to the relationsh 
established when a child is born to persons married to each other. 
(b) When a voluntary declaration of paternity is filed, the liabilities 
the father include, but are not limited to, the reasonable expense of tl 
mother's pregnancy and confinement and for the education, necessa 
support, and any funeral expenses for the child. 
(c) When a father voluntarily declares paternity, his liability for pa 
amounts due is limited to a period of four years immediately preceding tl 
date that the voluntary declaration of paternity was filed. 
(2) When a voluntary declaration of paternity is filed it shall be recognize 
as a basis for a child support order without any further requirement < 
proceeding regarding the establishment of paternity. 
(3) The voluntary declaration of paternity may be completed and signed ar 
time after the birth of the child. A voluntary declaration of paternity may n< 
be executed or filed after consent to or relinquishment for adoption has bee 
signed. 
(4) The voluntary declaration of paternity shall become an amendment t 
the original birth certificate. The original certificate and the declaration sha 
be marked so as to be distinguishable. The declaration may be included as pai 
of subsequently issued certified copies of the birth certificate. Alternativel 
electronically issued copies of a certificate may reflect the amended informs 
tion and the date of amendment only. 
(5) The voluntary declaration of paternity shall be in the form prescribed b 
the state registrar of vital statistics and shall be accompanied with a 
explanation of the alternatives to, the legal consequences of, and the rights an 
responsibilities that arise from signing the declaration. 
(6) The social security number of any person who is subject to a voluntar 
declaration of paternity shall be placed in the records relating to the matter 
History: C. 1953, 78-45e-2, enacted by L. 
1994, ch. 127, § 4; 1995, ch. 258, § 16; 1997, 
ch. 232, § 80. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend-
ment, effective July 1, 1997 added "and shall b 
accompanied..." in Subsection (5) and adde 
Subsection (6). 
PART 2 
DAVID W. STEFFENSEN, (A4677) 
STEFFENSEN MCDONALD STEFFENSEN 
675 East 2100 South, Suite 350 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephone: (801)485-1818 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DIVISION I 
SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
PROBATE DIVISION 
In the Matter of the Estate 
FINAL JUDGEMENT 
of 
Probate No. 973900253 
KORYPASQUIN, 
Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
Deceased. 
A trial was held regarding the petitioner's Petition for Determination of Heirs, the 
Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby, presiding, on December 1 through December 2, 1998 before the 
Court and a jury. The issues having been duly tried and the jury having duly rendered its verdict: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that Karly Madsen is an 
heir of Kory Pasquin's Estate entitled, under applicable statute, to one-half of Kory Pasquin's 
intestate estate. It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed that petitioner is entitled to reasonable 
attorney's fees and costs incurred in pursuing her petition in an amount to be determined by the 
Court, together with interest on such attorney's fees and costs accruing from the date this 
judgment is entered by the court. It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed that this judgment 
may be supplemented with petitioner's reasonable attorney's fees and costs of collecting this 
judgment, as may be established from time to time by affidavit. 
DATED this .2- day of A?*rc/ 
., 199^1 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Javid W. Steffense 
Attorney For Petitioner 
BY THE COURT 
HonoraW^Douglas L. Cornaby 
Robert H. Copier 




I hereby certify that on this
 m day of ^ QSAUJ^GV,^-^\ 3 1999, I 
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing paper to be mailed, jWstage prepaid, and 
addressed to: 
Robert Copier 
200 Metro Place 
243 East 400 South 
Suit Lake City, Utah 84111 
DATED this 2l day of
 v J 0 ^ U ^ 0 ^ > 1999. 
J 
PART 3 
DAVID W. STEFFENSEN, P.C. (4677) 
STEFFENSEN • MCDONALD * STEFFENSEN 
2159 South 700 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephone: (801) 485-1818 
Attorney for Petitioner, Karly Madsen 
THIRD JUDICLAL DISTRICT COURT, DIVISION I 
SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
PROBATE DIVISION 
In the Matter of the Estate 
AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID W. STEFFENSEN 
of REGARDING ATTORNEYS FEES, 
COSTS AND WITNESS FEES 
KORYPASQUTN, 
Deceased. 
Probate No. 973900253 
Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
STATE OF UTAH } 
)ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE } 
David W. Steffensen, having been first duly sworn, avers as follows: 
1. My name is David W. Steffensen, and my business address is 2159 South 700 
East, Suite 100, Salt Lake City, Utah 84106,485-1818. 
2. I have personal knowledge of the matters set forth in this Affidavit. If called upon 
to do so, I could and would testify to these matters in a court of law. 
3. I am an attorney licensed to practice in the State of Utah. I have practiced in the 
tax, estate planning and probate areas in Salt Lake County, Utah, for thirteen years. In addition, 
Richard L. King, an attorney practicing in my office, is licensed to practice in the State of Utah, 
and has so practiced law as a litigation attorney in Salt Lake County, Utah, for thirteen years. As 
a result, I am familiar with the rates charged by attorneys in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
4. In April of 1997,1 was reiained IO represent Karly Madsen, a minor, who 
successfully obtained a jury verdict on December 2, 1998, that she is an heir of the decedent, 
Kory Pasquin. In August of 1998,1 requested and obtained the able assistance of Richard L. 
King to help me finish the preparation of Karly Madsen's claim for trial, and to help me conduct 
the trial. 
5. In performing that successful representation of Karly Madsen, I performed 223 
hours of legal work, and Richard L. King performed, at my request and subject to my 
supervision, 51.75 hours of legal work. At our hourly rate of $150 per hour, which rate is a 
reasonable rate for attorneys with Mr. King's and my years of experience, the legal fees incurred 
total $41,212.50. In this regard, it should be noted that the 223 hours of legal work performed by 
me does not include 22 hours of work in representing Julie Flarity in her petition to have the 
personal representative removed. 
6. In addition, I have incurred and paid for the following costs and expenses in 









Subpoena fees for depositions and trial 
Constable 
Rocky Mountain Reporting-Deposition 







11/23/98 Dr. Kenneth Ward-Expert Witness Fee 1,000.00 
12/31/98 Dr. Kenneth Ward-Expert Witness Fee 2,806.00 
12/31/98 Billie Way: Transcript of Hearing 70.00 
12/31/98 Westlaw research charges 248.44 
TOTAL FEES AND COSTS: $4.733.28 
7. A detailed narrative of the fees, description of services rendered and costs and 
expenses incurred, totaling $45,945.78, is SQt forth in that certain Statement No. 1675 attached 
hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit "A." 
Dated this 2L day of January, 1999. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me by David W. Steffensen, a person I either know or 
who properly identified himself to me, this day of January, 1999. 
l ^ a r y Public 
My Commission Expires: 
N O f A R Y PUBLIC I 
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STATS OF UTAH . J 
DAVID W. STEFFENSEN, P.C. 
2159 South 700 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
(801) 485-1818 
Karl17" Madsen 
c/o Kristie Madsen, Guardian 
13 2 7 West Diane Drive 
Bennion UT 8412 3 
Account No: 





Attn: Kristie Madsen 
Kory Pasquin Estate/Intestacy Claim 




04/16/97 Review of probate file; legal research on 
guardian ad litem l.QG 
04/17/97 Preparation of petition to probate court; 
telephone conference with Kristie 2.5 0 
04/18/97 Preparation of petition to probate court; office 
conference with Kristie Madsen. .50 
05/05/97 Review of withdrawal of counsel. -25 
05/13/97 Office conference with Kristie Madsen regarding 
hearing; review of documents. 1.0 0 
05/14/97 Preparation of petition for determination of 
heirs and attendance at hearing. 1.0 0 
05/15/97 Review of documents received from Bob Copier. .25 
05/16/97 Preparation of letter to Bob Copier to demand 
withdrawal of notice of claim disallowance. .50 05/26/97 Legal Research regarding paternity testing and 
paternity evidentiary issues. 1.0 0 
05/28/97 Preparation of Objection to Disallowance of 
Claim, Affidavits; telephone conference with Bob 
Copier. 2.5 0 
Karly Madsen 







05/29/97 Preparation of documents; office conference with 
Geri Pasquin, Julie Flarity, and Kristie 
Madsen;telephone conference with Bob Copier. 
06/02/97 Review of dna subpoenas; telephone conference 
with Terry Rooney (attorney for dna lab) ; 
preparation of Gramma release authorizations. 
06/03/97 Review of objection; preparation of letter to Bob 
Copier. 
06/04/97 Review of pleadings. 
0 6/2 0/97 Telephone conference with Bob Copier regarding 
Gramma release form. 
06/27/97 Telephone conference with Bob Copierrs office; 
preparation of letter to Bob Copier regarding 
Gramma releases and motion to compel on dna test 
records. 
07/08/97 Telephone conference with Bob Copier regarding 
releases for DNA tests. 
07/22/97 Telephone conference with Bob Copier's office; 
telephone conference with Bob Copier regarding 
letuer; preparation of letter to Bob Copier. 
07/23/97 Preparation of motion to compel on DNA test 
documents; telephone conference with Kristie 
Madsen; telephone conference with Bob Copier; 
preparation of joint motion and order for release 
of DNA test records. 
0 8/28/97 Telephone conference with Kristie Madsen; 
telephone conference with Geri Pasquin; work on 
petitions. 
09/05/97 Preparation of letter to DNA lab to obtain 
documents with court order to compel. 






















09/18/97 Office conference with Kristie Madsen; follow up. 1.25 
09/22/97 Review of DNA testing documents; preparation of 
letter to Bob Copier. .75 
09/25/97 Telephone conference with Michael Lawrence and 
Yvette Madsen regarding social security issues; 
review Copier's letter. 1.2 5 
09/26/97 Preparation of interrogatories to Candy Suitter. .50 
10/2 0/9 7 Telephone conference with Yvette Madsen regarding 
probate, Karly's social security benefits. .50 
10/21/97 Telephone conference with Division of Family 
Services. .25 
10/28/97 Telephone conference with Geri pasquin; 
preparation for status conference. 2.2 5 
10/29/97 Attend pretrial status conference; out of the 
office conference with Bob Copier, Geri Pasquin, 
and Julie Flarity regarding settlement options. 2.50 
11/04/97 Telephone conference with Yvette Madsen. -25 
11/07/97 Review of Bob Copier's letter, proposedN 
settlement. -75 
11/11/97 Preparation of settlement documents. .25 
11/12/97 Preparation of settlement documents; telephone 
conference with Geri Pasquin and Steve 
Coonhousen. 4.00 
11/13/97 Preparation of settlement documents; telephone 
conference with Kristie Madsen regarding social 
security. 2.00 
11/14/97 Preparation of settlement documents. .50 
11/20/97 Telephone conference with Bob Copier regarding 
settlement. -25 
Karly Madsen 







12/01/97 Review of Bob Copier's motion/memo to strike 
hearing; call to Geri Pasquin; telephone 
conference with Bob Copier. .75 
12/02/9 7 Telephone conference with Bob Copier regarding 
settlement. 1.0 0 
12/04/97 Telephone conference with Bob Copier, Julie 
Flarity, and Ceri Pasquin regarding settlement. 1.50 
12/09/97 Preparation of letter to Bob Copier, witness 
designations; telephone conferences with DNA lab, 
Bob Copier; line up expert witness. 3.50 
12/12/97 Office conference with Geri Pasquin; telephone 
conference with Steve Taylor (John Pasquinrs 
attorney) regarding taking John Pasquinrs 
deposition. 2.25 
12/15/97 Out of the office conference with Dr. Ken Ward 
for expert interview. 1.0 0 
12/16/97 Preparation for depositions; preparation of 
letters to Copier. 1.5 0 
12/18/97 work on discovery. .50 
12/19/97 Telephone conference with Geri Pasquin; 
preparation for trial. 1.5 0 
12/22/97 Work on discovery. .50 
12/26/97 Preparation of depositions; review of documents; 
office conference with Kristie Madsen. 4.00 
12/27/97 Preparation for depositions. 3.50 
12/29/97 Preparation for and attend deposition of John 
Pasquin; prepared deposition record of Candy 
Suitter's deposition (she did not show). 5.0 0 
12/30/97 Preparation of supplemental discovery responses. 2.00 
Karly Madsen 
Kory Pasquin Estate/lntesuacy Claim 
01/23/ 
Account No: 493-00 
Statement No: 17 
01/02/98 Preparation of motion to compel. 
01/05/98 Preparation of objection to motion to strike. 
01/06/98 Preparation of Objection to Motion to Strike, 
memorandum, and supplemental affidavit. 
01/07/98 Preparation of Objection, memorandum, telephone 
conference with Kristie Madsen, trial 
preparation. 
01/08/98 Telephone conference with Yvette Madsen. 
01/09/98 Preparation for trial. 
01/12/98 Preparation of objection, memorandum, pretrial 
order, trial exhibits; telephone conference with 
Dr. Hallam. 
01/13/98 Preparation of pretrial order, motion in limine, 
memorandum, jury instructions, voir dire, trial 
exhibits. 
01/14/98 Preparation of trial brief and other trial 
documents. 
Q1/1S/98 Preparation for and attend pretrial conference. 
01/20/98 Preparation of objection and motion to compel 
Candy Suitter's deposition. 
01/23/98 Out of the office conference with Robert Copier; 
telephone conference with Robert Copier. 
01/27/98 Preparation of reply memo to objection to jury 
instructions, motion for summary judgment, and 
supporting memorandum. 
01/29/98 
02/03/98 Telephone conference with Yvette Madsen. 









































Preparation of letters. 
Review of documents from Robert Copier. 
Preparation of reply memoranda. 
Telephone conference with Robert Copier. 
Review of documents from Robert Copier. 
Preparation of objection to claim disallowance. 
Telephone conference with Julie Flarity for trial 
preparation. 
Office conference with Bob Copier regarding new 
trial date. 
Telephone conference with Geri Pasguin for trial 
preparation. 
Preparation of witnesses for trial. 
Office conference with Geri Pasquin for trial 
preparation. 
Preparation for trial. 
Preparation for trial. 
Preparation for trial. 
Telephone conference with Julie Flarity regarding 
trial preparation. 
09/04/98 Telephone conference with Dr. Ward's office 
regarding DNA Lab's certification. 
10/08/98 Preparation for motions argument. 





















Kory Pasquin Estate/Intestacy Claim 
01/23 
Account No: 4 93-0 
Statement No: 1 
10/21/98 Preparation for oral argument on all*pending 
motions. 
10/22/98 Preparation for oral argument on pending motions, 
10/23/98 Preparation for oral argument on pending motions. 
10/2 9/98 Preparation for oral argument on all pending 
motions. 
10/3 0/98 Preparation for and argue pending motions. 
11/02/98 Preparation of order on pending motions. 
11/05/98 Review of Copier's motion for Rule 54(b) relief. 
11/09/98 Preparation for trial. 
11/10/98 Preparation for trial. 
11/11/98 Preparation for trial. 
11/12/98 Preparation for trial. 
11/20/98 Preparation for meeting with Dr. Ward. 
11/23/98 Out of the office conference with Dr. Ward 
regarding expert testimony. 
11/24/98 Preparation for trial. 
11/25/98 Preparation for trial. 
11/30/98 Preparation for trial. 
12/01/98 Preparation for and conduct trial. 
12/02/98 Preparation for and conduct trial. 
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Kory Pasquin Estate/Intestacy Claim 
Account No: 
Statement No: 
p a g e : t 
0 l / 2 3 / 9 b 
493-G00> 
no: 
1 2 / 3 1 / 9 8 T e l e p h o n e c o n f e r e n c e w i t h Y v e t t e Madsen r e g a r d i n g 
t r i a l f o l l o w - u p i s s u e s . 
Hours 
25 
01/05/99 Preparation of affidavit regarding attorneys fees 
and costs. 2.00 
01/22/99 Preparation of judgment, affidavit re fees, 
notice to submit 2.50 
David W. Steffensen 223.00 
08/25/98 Review of trial brief; work on trial preparation 1.00 
08/26/98 Review of pleadings; preparation for trial 1.00 
10/2 0/98 Legal Research regarding standards for admission 
of scientific evidence and expert testimony 3.75 
10/23/98 Preparation for trial .25 
11/11/98 Legal Research regarding requirements for Rule 
54(b) relief; preparation of memorandum in 
opposition to Motion for Rule 54(b) relief 4.25 
11/16/98 Legal Research regarding Daubert standards and 
DNA testing 4 . 7 5 
11/17/98 Preparation of Rule 54(b) memorandum in 
opposition .25 
11/19/98 Legal Research regarding admissibility of RFLP 
DNA tests and the DAubert/Rimmasch standard 4.75 
11/24/98 Legal Research and drafting of Memorandum in 
Support of Request for Judicial Notice that RFLP 
test is inherently reliable 4.25 
11/25/98 Legal Research regarding motion in limine and 
memorandum in support thereof; preparation for 
trial 4.5 0 
11/3 0/98 Preparation for trial 5.0 0 
K a r l y Maasen 
Kory P a s q u i n E s t a t e / I n t e s t a c y C la im 
Account Mo: 
S t a t e m e n t No: 
U l / Z J / 
4 9 3 - 0 0 
17 
12/01/98 Preparation for and attendance at trial 
12/02/98 Preparation for and attendance at trial 
Richard L. King 







274.75 41r212 .! 
Timekeeper 
David W. Steffensen 
Richard L. King 
Recapitulation 
Hours Hourly Rate Total 
223.00 $150.00 $33,450.00 
51.75 150.00 7,762.50 
06/27/97 Constable for Service of Process or Pleadings 
10/11/97 Copying Charges 
12/15/97 Subpoena fees for depos and trial (Zions Bank, 
Candy Suitter, John Pasquin, and DNA Lab). 
01/24/98 Constable for Service of Process or Pleadings. 
02/25/98 Outside Professional Services: Rocky Mountain 
Reporting Services. 
10/10/98 Binders/tabs for court pleadings filed this week 
11/23/98 Dr. Kenneth Ward, expert witness fees 
12/31/98 Dr. Kenneth Ward, expert witness fee. 
12/31/98 Billie Way: hearing transcript 
12/31/98 Wesnlaw research charges (3098) 
Total Expenses 




















PAYMENT IS DUE IN 10 DAYS. THEREAFTER, INTEREST AT 
EIGHTEEN PERCENT (18%) A.P.R. WILL ACCRUE UNTIL PAID 
IN FULL. CLIENT SHALL BE LIABLE FOR REASONABLE ATTORNEYS 
FEES AND COSTS OF COLLECTION. 
PART 4 
DAVID W. STEFFENSEN, P.C. (4677) 
STEFFENSEN * MCDONALD • STEFFENSEN 
2159 South 700 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephone: (801) 485-1818 
Attorney for Petitioner, Karly Madsen 
THIRD JUDICLAL DISTRICT COURT, DIVISION I 
SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
PROBATE DIVISION 
In the Matter of the Estate 
ORDER AWARDING ATTORNEYS 
of FEES, COSTS AND WITNESS FEES 
KORY PASQUIN, Probate No. 973900253 
Deceased. Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
Petitioner, Karly Madsen's, Motion to Award Attorney's Fees and Costs came on for 
hearing before the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby on April 29? 1999. The Court, having 
reviewed Petitioner, Karly Madsen's, Motion to Award Attorney's Fees and Costs, Petitioner's 
Memorandum in Support thereof, the Affidavit of David W. Steffensen Regarding Attorney's 
Fees, Costs and Witness Expenses, The Estate's Consolidated Response to Pending Trial and 
Discovery Motions, the Estate's Request for Hearing on Pending Trial and Discovery Motions, 
the Estate's Memorandum in Opposition to Karly Madsen's Motion for Attorney's Fees7 
Petitioner's Reply Memorandum to the Estate's Consolidated Response to Pending Trial and 
Discovery Motions, Petitioner's Reply Memorandum to the Estate's Memorandum in Opposition 
EXHIBIT
 n n 
to Motion for Attorney's Fees, the Final Judgment, the other pleadings filed in this matter, 
having further received sworn testimony from David W. Steffensen at the hearing held on the 
Motion on April 29, 1999, who was cross examined thereon by counsel for the Decedent's 
Estate, and having further heard and considered the arguments of counsel for Petitioner, Kariy 
Madsen, and for the Decedent's Estate at said hearing held on the Motion on April 29, 1999, and 
finding sood cause therefor: 
HEREBY ORDERS that Petitioner Kariy Madsen's Motion to Award Attorney's Fees 
and Costs is hereby granted in the following respects: First, all attorneys fees in the amount of 
541,212.50 are approved and awarded to Petitioner, Kariy Madsen. Second, as to costs and 
witness fees, the following costs and witness fees are approved and awarded to Petitioner, Kariy 
Madsen: 
1. 6/27/97 Constable $10.00 
2. 10/11/97 Copying charges 4.25 
3. 12/15/97 Subpoena fees for depositions and trial 68.00 
4. 1/24/98 Constable 45.00 
5. 11/23/98 Dr. Kenneth Ward-Expert Witness Fee 1,000.00 
6. 12/31/98 Dr. Kenneth Ward-Expert Witness Fee 2,806.00 
Total Approved Costs : S3.933.25 
The following applied for costs are disallowed: 
1. 2/25/98 Rocky Mountain Reporting-Deposition 306.25 
2. 10/10/98 Binders/tabs for court pleadings 175.34 
3. 12/31/98 Billie Way: Transcript of Hearing 70.00 
4. 12/31/98 Westlaw research charses 248.44 
00802 
Accordingly, the total amount of attorneys fees and costs awarded to Petitioner, Karly 
Madsen, is 545,145.75, to be paid by th&Decedenf s Estate! 
DATED this ^ ' dSTof / lUQ^SA. 1999. 0 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Robert H. Copier 
Attorney for the Estate of Kory Pasquin 
HonorableB^Tid?? T rom^jr^ 
' l.-A 
PART 5 
Attorneys for Petitioner Sheri Marion 
45 East Vine Street j£M 3 p^ uO 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 262-6800 c W - _ J ^ f f l ^ ^ ^ 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PROBATE DIVISION 
In the matter of the Estate 
STIPULATION 
of : 
KORY PASQUIN, : Probate No. 973900253 EI 
Deceased. : Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
Sheri Marion and Kody Marion by and through their counsel of record, Michael E. 
Day; and Kristie Madsen and Karly Madsen by and through their counsel of record, David W. 
Steffensen; and the Estate of Kory Pasquin. by and though Roben H. Copier hereby stipulate 
and agree as follows: 
1. The parties stipulate to court-ordered DNx\ testing to be conducted using the 
blood, DNA7 and DNA information that is already in the possession of the University of Utah 
DNA lab that is purportedly the late Kory Pasquin's blood, DNA and DNA information and 
for court-ordered DNA testing of Sheri Marion and Kody Marion for the purpose of 
determining whether Kory Pasquin is the natural father of Kody Marion. 
2. The parties further stipulate that if the results from such DNA testing establish a 
paternity index greater than 150 as between Kory Pasquin and Kody Marion, such results will 
be taken as conclusive evidence that (1) Kody Marion is the natural child of Kory Pasquin, and 
(2) Karly Madsen is the natural child of Kory Pasquin; therefore determining once and for all 
that Kody Marion and Karly Madsen are heirs to the estate of Kory Pasquin. In such case, the 
Estate of Kory Pasquin agrees to withdraw its appeal and the parties stipulate to modify the 
Court's Final Judgment to state that Kody Marion is the natural child of Kory Pasquin and an 
heir to his estate. 
3. In the tvent that there is not sufficient blood, DNA, or other DNA information 
that is already in the possession of the University of Utah DNA lab to perform a reliable DNA 
test, or the results from such testing exclude the late Kory Pasquin as the father of Kody 
Marion or are otherwise inconclusive, then the parties stipulate that Kody Marion will not 
suffer any prejudice whatsoever from said events, but that Kody Marion will be free to 
otherwise establish that Kory Pasquin is his natural father, including, but not limited to, taking 
such measures as petitioning the court for an order to exhume Kory Pasquin's body and obtain 
oOcSnn 
DNA testing using a DNA sample retrieved directly fro 
DATED thisQ(JZ da-v ofiSwoiibef, 1999. 
-TtC'Lyf.
 ( 
Michael E. Day XJ 
Attorney for Sheri Marion ancTKody Marion 
asquin's body 
D t o - W . SteffeiisenX// 
Attorney for Kristie Madsen and Karly Madsen 
pberxJfe Copter 
AEtorney\for Candance M Souter, 
Personal representative for the 
Estate of K&jry Easquin 
I CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE COPY OF AN 
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT ON RLE IN THE THIRD 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Richard L. King 
2159 South 700 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephone: (801) 485-7138 
Bar Number: 4611 
I, Richard L. King, certify that on June 29,20011 served two copies of 
the attached Appellee's Brief upon Robert H. Copier, the counsel for 
the appellant in this matter, by mailing it to him by first class mail 
with sufficient postage prepaid to the following address: 
Robert H. Copier 
200 Metro Place 
243 East 400 South 
Suite 200, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2803 
Richard L. King I 
Attorney for Appellee 
Karly Madsen 
